Variaciones del modelo de competencia en precios : modelo de competencia en precios con productos diferenciados, el caso de interdependencia por redes de empresas.

Abstract

This paper examines the pricing decisions made by a network of firms to maximize profits with different types of goods. The model of price competition with diverse goods is used, assuming that the relationships of complementarity and substitution between firms are represented by a weighted directed graph. Additionally, the network of firms is assumed to be scale-free using the Barabási-Albert algorithm. The analytical solution of the model reveals that the Nash Equilibrium in prices for the network of firms is determined by the weight matrix of the network containing the degrees of complementarity and substitution. In numerical terms, the simulations show that when goods are substitutes, a small number of central firms set a higher price on average and produce more than the peripheral firms, resulting in higher profits. Conversely, when there are complementary goods, central firms not only set a lower price on average, but their production is also lower compared to peripheral firms, leading to lower profits. Additionally, it is demonstrated that for substitute and complementary goods, prices and quantities follow a normal distribution, while the profits of complementary goods do not exhibit this characteristic.